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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Italy, the Gelli-Bianco Law (referred to as the 2017 Law in 
this article)1 deals with the issue of medical malpractice, liability of 
the healthcare provider and, from a broader perspective, defensive 
medicine.2 The previous law (commonly referred to as the Balduzzi 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   Assistant Professor, University of Bologna School of Law; LL.M., Loui-
siana State University; Doctorate in Comparative Law, University of Milan. 
 1. Legge Mar. 8, 2017, n. 24, G.U. Mar. 17, 2017, n. 64. It is commonly 
referred to as the Gelli-Bianco Law due to the name of the two members of the 
Parliament who submitted the relevant text. 
 2. Defensive medicine occurs when physicians order unnecessary treat-
ments and excessively rely on tests and procedures (i.e., positive defensive medi-
cine), or when they refuse to treat patients that present a high degree of risk, in an 
effort to avoid malpractice suits rather than because they consider the treatment 
medically appropriate (i.e., negative defensive medicine). See U.S. Congress, Of-
fice of Technological Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice 
3, OTA-H--602 (1994), quoted by Sira Grosso, What Is Reasonable and What 
Can Be Proved as Reasonable: Reflections on the Role of Evidence-Based Medi-
cine and Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Negligence Claims, 27 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 74, 76 n. 13 (2018); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, 
Medicine and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 268 (2001). 
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Law3) was enacted in 2012 and represented the first legislative at-
tempt to put a limit to professional liability grounded on medical 
malpractice in light of the settled judicial orientation of the previous 
case law.4 Indeed, until 2012, without a specific legal framework for 
medical malpractice, Italian judges and Italian doctrine addressed 
the issue.5  
                                                                                                             
 3. Decreto Legge Sept. 13, 2012, n. 158, G.U. Sept. 13, 2012, n. 214 con-
verted with amendments in Legge Nov. 8, 2012, n. 189, G.U. Nov. 10, 2012, n. 
263 (“Urgent provisions to foster the development of the Country through a higher 
level of health’s protection”). 
 4. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, La responsabilità medica: dal primato 
della giurisprudenza alla disciplina legislativa, 8-9 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 
819 (2016). 
 5. Pursuant to the Italian case-law, medical malpractice used to be encom-
passed within the range of application of art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code 
(“C.c.”). Art. 2043 C.c. (Compensation for unlawful acts) provides the general 
norm for tort liability. However, starting from 1999, the Italian Supreme Court 
(with ruling n. 589/1999), through the recourse to the fictio iuris of the so called 
contatto sociale between the physician and the patient, deemed such liability as a 
contractual one, thus applying the relevant legal regime, more favorable to the 
patient. On behalf of the healthcare provider, it used to be invoked the application 
of art. 2236 C.c., limiting the liability of the practitioner to the event of her malice 
or gross negligence, but only for cases requiring the solution of technical issues 
of particular difficulty. See, ex multis, Guido Alpa, Ars interpretandi e 
responsabilità sanitaria a seguito della nuova legge Bianco-Gelli, 3 CONTRATO 
E IMPRESA 728, 732 (2017) [hereinafter Alpa, Ars interpretandi]. Besides the lia-
bility of the physician, it used to be affirmed that the contractual liability of the 
healthcare institution (public and/or private) due to the atypical contract (i.e., con-
tratto di spedalità), expressly or implicitly entered into force between the patient 
and the institution. In light of its peculiarities, the medical malpractice used to be 
deemed by some commentators and tribunals as a sub-system of civil liability. 
See, ex multis, Carlo Granelli, Il fenomeno della medicina difensiva e la legge di 
riforma della responsabilità sanitaria, 2 RESP. CIV. PREV. 410, nn.120-131 
(2018); RAFFAELLA DE MATTEIS, LA RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA: UN 
SOTTOSISTEMA DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (CEDAM Padova, 1995); 
Vincenzo Roppo, La responsabilità civile dell’impresa nel settore dei servizi 
innovativi, CONTRATO E IMPRESA 891, 894 (1993). According to other scholars, 
though speaking of “system” would raise conceptual issues, medical malpractice 
should nevertheless be intended as a special regime comparable to that of tort 
liability; see Guido Alpa, From the Physician to the Team, to the Healthcare Set-
ting, to the System, in LAW AND MEDICINE—CURRENT TOPICS IN A GERMAN AND 
ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (Consiglia Botta & Christian Armbrüster eds., 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2017). The 2017 Law has introduced specific pro-
visions dealing with the proper qualification of medical malpractice: see infra, § 
III. For interesting remarks about individual liability and the evolution of the law 
of torts, see Olivier Moréteau, Individual Liability in a Vulnerable Environment: 
Revisiting the Ethical Foundations of Tort Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAAP 
SPIER 239-257 (Helmut Koziol & Ulrich Magnus eds., Jan Sramek Verlag 2016). 
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The legislative intervention reveals the constant interest for the 
subject matter as well as the difficulties to cope with its related is-
sues. Like the previous legislation, the 2017 Law addresses the topic 
from a wide perspective, insofar as it does not focus only on medical 
malpractice, but rather on liability of healthcare providers in gen-
eral, and it outlines a comprehensive system aimed at achieving the 
safety of healthcare through different interventions. Furthermore, it 
approaches medical malpractice encompassing new criteria. In par-
ticular, the law tries to allocate the liability regime from a legal and 
economic perspective, though charging the economic consequences 
of an adverse event on the entity better able to bear it (i.e., the public 
or private healthcare institution).  
Last but not least, in the original intention of the legislature, the 
2017 Law was to reduce defensive medicine,6 thus benefiting pa-
tients. In particular, the 2017 Law intended to address the topics of 
medical malpractice, defensive medicine and safety of patients in-
troducing a more favorable regime of professional liability for the 
healthcare providers, both from the civil law and the criminal law 
perspective, focused on a new and more detailed role for Clinical 
Practice Guidelines (CPGs).7 
In its original intention, it should have redressed some gaps and 
limits of the Balduzzi Law on the one hand, and, it should have de-
creased defensive medicine and healthcare liability on the other 
hand, by providing judges with clearer and more favorable rules and 
standard of behavior for healthcare professionals. In spite of several 
positive aspects, the 2017 Law did not reach its ambitious goal, in 
particular because of the limits of the new regime for criminal lia-
bility.8 The legislative choice to give CPGs a determinant role in the 
                                                                                                             
 6. See generally Carlo Granelli, La medicina difensiva in Italia, 1 RESP. CIV. 
PREV. 22 (2016); ADELMO MANNA, MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E DIRITTO PENALE. TRA 
LEGALITÀ E DIRITTO ALLA SALUTE (Pisa U. Press 2014); ALESSANDRO ROIATI, 
MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E COLPA PROFESSIONALE MEDICA IN DIRITTO PENALE. TRA 
TEORIA E PRASSI GIURISPRUDENZIALE (Giuffrè 2012). 
 7. See Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 729-731. 
 8. See infra, § V. 
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professional liability of healthcare providers’ cases seems to follow 
the U.S. legal system, where the topic of Evidence-Based Medicine9 
and that of CPGs originated and have gained primary importance 
even for purposes of legislative reforms.  
CPGs are commonly associated to Evidence Based Medicine 
(EBM). However, many commentators stress the conceptual differ-
ence between them, highlighting that EBM involves much more 
than CPGs. Yet the latter, when really evidence-based, can facilitate 
the practice of EBM by serving as codifications of the best evidence 
available. Thus, CPGs are useful, if not essential components of 
EBM.10 
In the U.S., the legal system for medical liability is based on the 
negligence standard.11 Currently, neither law nor jurisprudence 
                                                                                                             
 9. The first to use the term Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) has been Gor-
don Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP J. CLUB A16 (1991) (pointing 
out the trend towards the best use of scientific literature and biomedical develop-
ment in medical decision-making). See also David Sackett, Evidence Based Med-
icine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (defining EBM 
as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in mak-
ing decisions about the care of individual patients”); Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epis-
temology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical 
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002); Roger Sur & Philip Dahm, History of 
Evidence-Based Medicine, 27 INDIAN J. UROL. 487 (2011). 
 10. For the features of the tort of negligence and the relevance of the require-
ment of the duty of care, see Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the 
Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the 
Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 486-487 (2004) [hereinafter 
Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine]. CPGs used to be defined by the Institute of 
Medicine as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and pa-
tient decision about the appropriate health care for specific clinical circum-
stances,” see Committee on Clinical Practice Guidelines, Institute of Medicine, 
Guidelines for Medical Practice 2 (Marylin J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds. 
1992). Currently, their revised definition reads: “statements that include recom-
mendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a systematic 
review of evidence and in assessment of the benefits and harms of alternative care 
options.” See Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Standards for Develop-
ing Trustworthy Clinical Practice Guidelines, Clinical Practice Guidelines We 
Can Trust (Robin Graham, Michelle Mancher, Dianne Miller Wolman, Sheldon 
Greenfield, & Earl Steinberg eds., National Academies Press 2011) [hereinafter 
Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust]. As it can be inferred by a comparison 
between the two definitions, the latest puts more emphasis on the methodology in 
the process of CPGs’ selection. 
 11. See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 (Scot.); Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); and MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)). 
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clearly and uniformly define the standard of care for claims of med-
ical malpractice. Traditionally, the so called “customary standard” 
(i.e., what is usually done in a specific field) used to be adopted. 
However, with development of EBM, nowadays there has been a 
shift towards a more objective and scientifically grounded stand-
ard.12 Many commentators struggled with the role of CPGs, in par-
ticular whether they might be intended as a legal standard of care to 
be applied by courts in medical malpractice suits, or whether they 
might be used as evidence of the standard of care. In spite of the 
increasing role gained by CPGs, a review of the literature about their 
legal effects reveals how they so far cannot be intended as a binding 
standard of care in light of many criticalities surrounding the CPGs’ 
phenomenon (e.g., the issue of conflict of interests among different 
stakeholders, the issue of reliability, trustworthiness, and accounta-
bility of CPGs, the gap between the theoretical perspective of CPGs 
and the peculiarities of each patient, the difficulty to cope with pa-
tients affected by several diseases, and the risks of the so called 
“cookbook medicine”). Accordingly, the topic of EBM and CPGs, 
as related to that of medical malpractice and defensive medicine, has 
been extensively investigated and argued in U.S. doctrine.13 
                                                                                                             
 12. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), set-
ting forth a standard according to which an expert’s theory is reliable if it meets 
four requirements: 1) it is possible to test the theory; 2) it was submitted to peer 
review and publication; 3) it points out the potential rate of error; 4) it is generally 
accepted by the scientific community. 
 13. Among the manifold contributions, see Grosso, supra note 2 (focusing on 
the issues related to EBM, CPGs and the standard of care within medical practice, 
contending that the postulated link between an uncertain legal standard and de-
fensive medicine may be overstated, and that promoting a cultural shift in the 
doctor-patient relationship would be more effective in reducing the defensive 
medicine trend); Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice 
Guidelines and Malpractice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS. 
L. J. 273 (2013-2014) (deeming that the use of CPGs may improve the quality of 
healthcare in the U.S., analyzing three accountability models—public, private and 
semi-public—for CPGs, and arguing in favor of a private competitive regime for 
CPGs); Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 543 
(2011) (arguing in favor of a private regulation regime (PRR) under which private 
firms would develop and update CPGs and they would compete to license their 
own CPGs to medical providers, being liable for putting forth sub-optimal guide-
lines); Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in 
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the U.S. Health Care System, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman, 
Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1165 
(2012) (outlining the historical evolution of medical practice and its legal impli-
cations, with particular regard to the standard of care, and reporting the most im-
portant legislative attempts to introduce legal defenses on behalf of practitioners, 
such as that of Maine, Vermont, Florida and Minnesota); Maxwell J. Mehlman, 
Medical Malpractice Guidelines as Malpractice Safe Harbors: Illusion or De-
ceit?, 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2012); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines in Healthcare Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21 
(2012) (pointing out that EBM is an essential part of the nation's healthcare reform 
strategy and the role of CPGs to implement it; highlighting some key develop-
ments and issues in the CPGs movement, and focusing on the activity of the IOM 
(Institute of Medicine) to develop trustworthy and reliable CPGs); John Tucker, 
A Novel Approach to Determine Best Medical Practices: Looking at the Evidence, 
10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147 (2009); Michelle H. Lewis et al., The Local-
ity Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local medical Practices and the National 
Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633 (2007) (pointing out that the applicable stand-
ard of care in medical malpractice lawsuits varies among jurisdictions in the U. S.  
and arguing that the locality rule is difficult to justify, as medical education has 
become more standardized and modern technology provides rural physicians with 
the same access to information for patient care as urban ones); James F. Blum-
stein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice “Safe Har-
bors” as a New Role for Q10s?, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017 (2006) (focusing on de-
termination of liability for medical malpractice purposes through the modification 
of the standard adopted in targeted areas); Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer 
Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From Tort Doctrine Toward Con-
tract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1179 (2006) (describing the doctrines applicable to medical malpractice and fo-
cusing on the role of CPGs); James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies: 
Can They Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 33 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 783 (2005) (reporting the definitions of relevant tools for medical prac-
tice, such as protocols, practice guidelines, clinical pathways, etc.); Williams, Ev-
idence-Based Medicine, supra note 10 (emphasizing how some courts affirmed 
the physician’s “duty to stay abreast” with the latest medical science, stressing the 
difference between EBM and CPGs, and contending to bifurcate the standard of 
care for medical practice in substantial and procedural one); Michelle M. Mello, 
Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging 
Legal, Clinical and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 821 (2002) 
(arguing that attempting to integrate clinical practice guidelines into malpractice 
litigation suggests that practical and conceptual problems involved in merging the 
cultures of medicine, science, and law should not be underestimated); Michelle 
M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001) [hereinafter 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields] (developing a seminal analysis about the role of 
CPGs, the main features of medical malpractice litigation, the legislative attempts 
to provide healthcare professionals with a shield to defend themselves from al-
leged professional liability, and contending that CPGs cannot be deemed as a legal 
standard of care); Elise C. Becher & Mark Chassin, Improving the Quality of 
Health Care: Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164 (2001) (defining quality 
problems of CPGs as underuse, overuse and misuse); Arnold J Rosoff, Evidence-
Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 327 (2001); Arnold J Rosoff, The Role of Clinical 
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 The approach adopted by the Italian lawmaker also follows the 
path devised by the European institutions. According to the EU ap-
proach, although this area of law pertains to the competence of the 
Member States,14 it is important to set an EU common level of health 
protection through, among other means, the development of the re-
course to CPGs.15 
The new system depicted by the 2017 Law has, thus, been en-
riched with further provisions dealing with different aspects of the 
healthcare field, aimed at pursuing the same target. For example, the 
law sets thresholds for the amount of damage to be compensated by 
the physician on behalf of public hospitals or other public healthcare 
entities in the event of liability of the hospital due to the gross neg-
ligence of the physician (art. 9).16 Article 12 also requires that 
                                                                                                             
Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369 (1995) (pro-
posing a system that would grant the Federal Government the task not to develop 
guidelines, but rather to certify privately developed CPGs); Angela Campbell & 
Kathleen Cranley Grass, The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, 
and Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research, 46 MCGILL L. J. 473 (2001) 
(arguing about the role of professional norm and/or legal norm of CPGs); Michael 
Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? 
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); Barry R. Furrow, Broad-
casting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune In?, 25 AM. J. 
L. & MED. 403 (1999) (arguing on behalf of CPGs and providing an overview of 
the main on-line (at that time) available CPGs’ databases); William R. Trail & 
Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening 
of Pandora’s Box, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 231 (1995-1996) (analyzing four basic types 
of government created medical practice guidelines and arguing that the first 
type—i.e., State created affirmative defense—would be the optimal practice 
guidelines program); Daniel Jutras, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Legal Norms, 
148 CANAD. MED. J. ASSOC. 905 (1993) (focusing on the potential liability result-
ing from the drafting and implementation of CPGs); Clark C. Havighurst, Prac-
tice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBL. 87 (1991); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Med-
ical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 777 (1990). 
 14. For an overview of the different national legal systems within the Euro-
pean Union, see EWOUD HONDIUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL LIABILITY 
(Ewoud Hondius ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010); MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: 
A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Bernard A. Koch ed., De Gruyter 
2011). 
 15. See, e.g., Athanasios Panagiotou, Professional Standards, Clinical 
Guidelines and Medical Liability: A Chance for Significant Improvement in De-
termining the Standard of Care?, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 157 (2018). 
 16. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, Medical Malpractice: La Legge Bianco 
Gelli. Una Premessa, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 268 (2017). 
378 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 11 
 
 
 
healthcare institutions17 have mandatory insurance-coverage; thus, 
trying to limit the practice, common in recent years, of self-insured 
retention (S.I.R.). Furthermore, art. 10, § 6 of the law allows victims 
of alleged medical malpractice to directly sue the insurance com-
pany of the healthcare institution and/or the healthcare provider im-
plementing a special fund for damages arising from medical mal-
practice.18 Additionally, art. 8 of the 2017 Law imposes a mediation 
proceeding as a mandatory pre-requirement to file a malpractice 
suit.19 
This contribution will specifically focus on the new regime of 
the healthcare provider’s liability and on the key role played by 
CPGs. In particular, section II will briefly explain the previous legal 
regime and the relevant judicial orientation based on settled case 
law; section III will address the main features of the 2017 Law; sec-
tion IV will deal with the case law developed after the enactment of 
the 2017 Law; and section V will focus on the topic of the patient’s 
informed consent. Then, final remarks will be expressed. 
II. THE BALDUZZI LAW 
The Balduzzi Law was the first legislative attempt to provide for 
medical malpractice in order to limit the phenomenon of defensive 
medicine, with specific provisions in terms of both civil and 
criminal liability to be applied to healthcare professionals in general. 
In spite of its laconic and incomplete text,20 the Balduzzi Law was 
                                                                                                             
 17. See, e.g., Leonardo Bugiolacchi, Le strutture sanitarie e l’assicurazione 
per la R.C. verso terzi: natura e funzione dell’assicurazione obbligatoria nella 
legge n. 24/2017 (Legge “Gelli/Bianco”), 3 RESP. CIV. PREV. 133 (2017). 
 18. See Maurizio Hazan, L’azione diretta nell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
della RC sanitaria (e il regime delle eccezioni), 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 317 
(2017). 
 19. See generally Rosanna Breda, La responsabilità civile delle strutture 
sanitarie e del medico tra conferme e novità, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 283, 
286 (2017). 
 20. Terms adopted by the Supreme Court of Cassation, see Cass., sez. IV 
penale, Apr. 9, 2013, n. 16237, § 4 [hereinafter Cantore]. 
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significant under two different aspects.21 For the first time, it 
introduced the distinction between slight and gross negligence22 for 
the affirmation or exclusion of criminal liability. Secondly, the 
Balduzzi Law also enhanced the role of CPGs. In addition, it 
represented the outcome of a debate arisen from a heterogeneous 
context: the defensive needs of healthcare providers, victim 
expectations, the issues of properly allocating healthcare costs, the 
balance between therapeutic necessities, and the limits of public 
financial resources.  
 The keystone of the law was its art. 3:  
The healthcare provider who, in the execution of her perfor-
mance complies with clinical guidelines and good clinical 
customs accredited by the scientific community, is not crim-
inally liable for slight negligence.23 In these cases, the obli-
gation arising from art. 2043 C.c. [Civil Code] is maintained. 
In determining the compensation of the damage, the judge 
shall duly consider the behavior set forth in the first para-
graph. 
The text has raised many issues about its meaning and range of ap-
plication. A concern dealt also with the alleged unconstitutionality 
                                                                                                             
 21. See, e.g., Ombretta Di Giovine, In Difesa del c.d. Decreto Balduzzi 
(Ovvero: Perché Non È Possibile Ragionare di Medicina Come Se Fosse Diritto 
e di Diritto Come Se Fosse Matematica)?, 1 ARCH. PEN. 3 (2014). 
 22. For an interesting comparative analysis about fault liability and for the 
relevant terminology, see Gert Brüggemeier, Fault Liability Today. A Critical 
View of the Cathedral, 1 OPINIO JURIS COMPARATIONE 1 (2014), available at 
https://perma.cc/CWF6-X9HA.  
 23. Pursuant to the Italian Penal Code (“C.p.”), art. 43—Mental Element of 
the Offenses—a crime shall be 1) intentional, i.e., according to intention, when 
the harmful or dangerous event, which is the result of the act or omission, and on 
which the existence of the crime depends, is foreseen and desired by the actor as 
a consequence of his own act or omission; shall be 2) preterintentional, i.e., in 
excess of intention, when the act or omission is followed by a harmful or danger-
ous event more serious than that desired by the actor; shall be 3) negligent, i.e., 
contrary to intention, when the event, even though foreseen, is not desired by the 
actor and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness or failure to 
observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols. As for negligence, the first kind 
(i.e., carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness) is named “generic negligence,” 
while the second (failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols) is 
named “specific negligence.” 
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of this provision in light of art. 3 of the Italian Constitution (affirm-
ing the principle of equality24) due to the more favorable regime for 
healthcare providers in comparison with other socially relevant pro-
fessions, equally complex and potentially risky.25  
Most notably, for the first time, the Balduzzi Law introduced the 
distinction between slight and gross criminal negligence. Until then, 
art. 133 of the Criminal Code was used, among other criteria, to de-
termine quam in concreto the extent of the criminal sanction. 
Through the Balduzzi Law, criteria are used to affirm or deny the 
criminal liability of the healthcare provider. Therefore, under this 
regime, the distinction became the “turning point” between liability 
and no liability.  
The first obstacle arose from the fact that the Balduzzi Law did 
not explain the difference between the two categories of negligence. 
Thus, the courts were left with the task to conceptually identify and 
distinguish between them, in particular in the borderline cases.26 
Therefore, it has been up to judicial interpretation to clarify the 
range of application of the Balduzzi Law provisions. In particular, 
the Supreme Court stressed that the judicial history of medical mal-
practice is the topos for the study of professional negligence, espe-
cially when dealing with gross negligence.27  
                                                                                                             
 24. Art. 3, para. 1 Costituzione: “All citizens have equal social dignity and 
are equal in front of the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, 
political opinion, personal and social conditions.” 
 25. See Trib. Milano, sez. IX penale, ordinanza Mar. 21, 2013 and comment 
by Marco Scoletta, Rispetto delle linee guida e non punibilità della colpa lieve 
dell’operatore sanitario: la “norma penale di favore” al giudizio della Corte 
costituzionale, ibidem, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, Mar. 29, 2013, 
available at https://perma.cc/8U68-Y3SU. However, the recourse has been re-
jected by the Constitutional Court, holding that the ordinance a quo did not 
properly described the issue and lacked an adequate reasoning supporting the im-
portance of the request. Corte Cost., ord. Dec. 6, 2013, n. 295, available at 
https://perma.cc/MRL6-5ZX2. 
 26. See, e.g., Domenico Pulitanò, Responsabilità medica: letture e valuta-
zioni divergenti del novum legislativo, 4 DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO 73 
(2013) (proposing the distinction between imperfect performances (subject to 
punishment only in cases of gross negligence) and perfect non-performances, oc-
curring in case of clear non-compliance with the CPGs and subject to punish-
ment). 
 27. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5. 
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In this regard, the evolution can be divided into three different 
periods. During the first period, from the enactment of the Civil 
Code until the 1980s, the courts tended to adopt a very favorable 
approach for the physicians, and their liability used to be affirmed 
only in very outrageous cases due to the “macroscopic” violation of 
the most elementary rules of the ars medica. Pursuant to this view, 
the exclusion of liability used to be the rule, whereas its affirmation 
used to be the exception. The normative ground of this approach is 
identified in art. 2236 C.c.,28 which was interpreted as requiring the 
affirmation of liability only in very strict cases of macroscopic mis-
take. In particular, the application of art. 2236 C.c. to the criminal 
area used to be justified on the basis of the inner consistency of the 
legal system as a whole. However, it must be noted that, under this 
perspective, it is up to the physician to prove the occurrence of pe-
culiar technical difficulties and the release from liability applies 
only to cases of unskillfulness, not to carelessness or imprudence.29 
The concern about the constitutional compliance of this ap-
proach with the principle of equality set forth in art. 3 of the Italian 
Constitution was addressed by the Constitutional Court in 1973.30 
The Court found that the interpretation above complies with the Ital-
ian Constitution since arts. 589, 42, 43 C.p. and art. 2236 C.c. give 
rise to a peculiar legal regime for intellectual professionals (like 
physicians, lawyers, engineers, etc.) aimed at facing two opposite 
purposes: on one side, not to mortify the initiative of the professional 
with the fear of unfair retaliation in the event of her failure and, on 
the other, not to indulge on behalf of the inconsiderate decision or 
                                                                                                             
 28. Art. 2236 C.c., Liability of the performer of a work: “If the performance 
implies the solution of technical issues of particular difficulty, the performer is 
not liable for damages unless in the event of her malice or gross negligence.” 
 29. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5. See ALBERTO CRESPI, LA 
RESPONSABILITÀ PENALE NEL TRATTAMENTO MEDICO-CHIRURGICO CON ESITO 
INFAUSTO (Priulla 1955); Alberto Crespi, I recenti orientamenti giurisprudenziali 
nell’accertamento della colpa professionale del medico chirurgo: evoluzione o 
involuzione?, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 785, 789 (1992). 
 30. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 28, 1973, n. 166, available at https://perma 
.cc/MRL6-5ZX2. 
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reprehensible omissions of the professional. However, this regime 
shall apply only in cases of particular technical difficulties and only 
when unskillfulness is at stake.31 
During the second period, from the 1980s to 2007, a new ap-
proach was favored, based on the relational nature of the patient-
professional link: the uniform judicial orientation was aimed at pro-
tecting the patient’s health, thus increasing the range of liability of 
the physician. Consequently, the special regime of art. 2236 C.c. 
was neglected for the purposes of criminal law, on the assumption 
that civil law and criminal law are different domains.32 
Finally, as of the third period, starting from 2007,33 it has been 
deemed that, although art. 2236 C.c. cannot be directly applied to 
criminal law, its ratio can operate as rule of experience to be taken 
into account by the judge when assessing the behavior of the profes-
sional in event of emergencies, or when the case implies the solution 
of particularly complex issues. Consequently, art. 2236 C.c. stands 
for the codification of an inner logical and empirical rule, underlying 
the whole legal system.34 
As above mentioned, through the Balduzzi Law, the Italian law-
maker intended to outline a legal framework to provide for a topic 
so far exclusively governed by judicial precedents: in particular, the 
Balduzzi Law clarifies the nature of (and the requirements for) pro-
fessional liability of the healthcare providers in general, and fosters 
the role of CPGs to guide the professional’s behavior.35 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 6. See Fabio Basile, Un itinerario 
giurisprudenziale sulla responsabilità medica colposa tra art. 2236 Cod. Civ. e 
Legge Balduzzi (aspettando la riforma della riforma), 2 DIRITTO PENALE 
CONTEMPORANEO 159 (2017). 
 33. Cass. Sez. IV penale June 21, 2007, n. 39592. 
 34. See, e.g., Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 5, 2011, n. 16328 (“Montalto”); see 
also Cass., sez. IV penale, Nov. 22, 2011, n. 4391 (“Di Lella”). 
 35. For interesting remarks about the relationship between CPGs and the 
healthcare professional’s behavior, see ANDREA R. DI LANDRO, DALLE LINEE 
GUIDA E DAI PROTOCOLLI ALL’INDIVIDUALIZZAZIONE DELLA COLPA PENALE NEL 
SETTORE SANITARIO. MISURA OGGETTIVA E SOGGETTIVA DELLA “MALPRACTICE” 
(Giappichelli 2012). 
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However, despite the determinant role granted to CPGs and 
good clinical practices, it failed to properly define and identify them, 
thus leaving room to practical uncertainties and allowing strategic 
defenses like the reference to the so-called posthumous (search for) 
guidelines. This phenomenon occurs when a physician charged with 
a malpractice claim points out, on an ex-post basis, a guideline as a 
justification of her previous behavior.36 The generic reference of art. 
3 to improperly qualified guidelines allowed the professional to 
avoid liability by referring to guidelines not necessarily known, or 
not specifically taken into account, by her at the moment of the de-
cision-making process and that of performance.  
The Balduzzi Law also failed to provide a criterion to select, 
among the manifold available guidelines, those grounded on scien-
tific evidence and therefore reliable, making only a generic refer-
ence to guidelines “accredited by the scientific community.”37 An 
additional concern dealt with the proper identification of the range 
of application of the waiver of criminal liability set forth by art. 3.38 
In particular, it was controversial whether this rule ought to be ap-
plied to all types of negligence (i.e., carelessness, imprudence, and 
unskillfulness) or to the sole cases of unskillful behavior.39 Indeed, 
in spite of some diverging opinions, the Supreme Court has eventu-
ally excluded the criminal liability of the healthcare provider in all 
cases of slight criminal negligence, regardless of the nature of neg-
ligence (thus, either in cases of carelessness, imprudence, or unskill-
                                                                                                             
 36. Paolo Piras, Il discreto invito della giurisprudenza a fare noi la riforma 
della colpa medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, July 4, 2017, § 7, 
available at https://perma.cc/52N8-CGTQ. 
 37. The same concern about reliability and trustworthiness of CPGs has been 
expressed and extensively investigated within the U.S. scenario, see Mello, Of 
Swords and Shields, supra note 13, at 650-652. Eventually, the IOM has particu-
larly focused its attention on such issue as can be inferred by the latest definition 
of CPGs, see Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust supra note 10. 
 38. See art. 3 of Balduzzi Law cited in text above note 23.  
 39. See Brüggemeier, supra note 22. 
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ful behavior) and, in so doing, has resolved the controversial con-
ceptual issue to distinguish among the three types of fault, while at 
the same time preserving equal treatment among professionals.40 
In brief, on one side, thanks to the dialogue between the legisla-
tive and judicial formants,41 the conceptual achievements in mal-
practice, except for some unsolved issues, were quite noteworthy.42 
However, on the other side, the phenomenon of defensive medicine 
had increased.43 One of the main unsolved issues dealt with the na-
ture of medical liability. Indeed, in spite of the clear and straightfor-
ward legislative provision regarding the nature of medical liability 
(i.e., tort liability), Italian courts used to affirm constantly its con-
tractual nature, with all the legal consequences this entails regarding 
the burden of proof and prescription or the statute of limitation.44 
This, inter alia, has been pointed out among the factors determining 
the increase of the phenomenon of defensive medicine. 
The aim of the 2017 Law, at least in the beginning, was to clear 
up those critical elements, for example the role of CPGs and their 
proper identification. However, the final outcome seems so far to 
                                                                                                             
 40. Cass., sez. IV penale, June 6, 2016, n. 23283 [hereinafter Denegri]; Cass., 
sez. IV penale, July 1, 2015, n. 45527 (“Cerracchio”); Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct. 
9, 2014, n. 47289 (“Stefanetti”). 
 41. From the comparative-law perspective, “legal formants” are those ele-
ments concurring to characterize a particular legal system and which must be 
taken into account to have a proper knowledge of it: paradigmatic examples of 
legal formants are, in addition to legislative provisions, court rulings, academic 
writing, professional and administrative practice developed in a particular context. 
See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343 (1991). 
 42. See Cantore, supra note 20 and Denegri, supra note 40. 
 43. See Carlo Brusco, Informazioni statistiche sulla giurisprudenza penale di 
legittimità in tema di responsabilità medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, 
July 14, 2016, available at https://perma.cc/H7QA-KVAX; Nicola Enrichens, Le 
linee guida tra medici, pazienti e diritto: alcune osservazioni, RIV. RESP. MEDICA, 
Mar. 13, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/Y9BW-H6S8. For further statistical 
data, see also Federico Valentini, Il nuovo assetto della responsabilità sanitaria 
dopo la riforma Gelli-Bianco, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 1395 (2017). 
 44. A further distinction between the two regimes, in transnational cases, 
deals with the criteria to identify the governing law (i.e., pursuant to EU Rome I 
Regulation for contractual obligations and EU Rome II Regulation for non-con-
tractual obligations) and the forum (i.e., EU Brussels I bis Regulation).  
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have missed the point and, while the 2017 Law has certainly pro-
vided a contribution to the proper identification of relevant CPGs, it 
seems to have moved backward in comparison to the Balduzzi Law, 
at least from the criminal liability perspective. 
III. THE 2017 LAW  
The 2017 Law, entitled “Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza 
delle cure e della persona assistita, nonché in materia di re-
sponsabilità professionale degli esercenti le professioni sanitarie” 
[Provisions on safety of the healthcare and of the patient, as well as 
on professional liability of the healthcare providers], addresses, as 
the heading reveals, different aspects of the healthcare world, en-
compassing provisions of different nature. In particular, it adopts a 
broad approach to the above-mentioned topic,45 providing that: 
− The safety of healthcare is an essential part of the constitutional 
right of health46 and it is pursued on behalf of the individual and 
of the community (art. 1, § 1); 
                                                                                                             
 45. For a general introduction to the 2017 Law, see GUIDO ALPA, LA 
RESPONSABILITÀ SANITARIA. COMMENTO ALLA L. 8 MARZO 2017, N. 24 (Pacini 
2017). 
 46. Art. 32, para. 1 Costituzione: “The Republic safeguards health as a fun-
damental right of the individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free 
medical care to the indigent.” This article depicts the general framework of the 
right to health as a fundamental right of the human being, and as interest of the 
community, combined with the guarantee of gratuitous treatment for needy peo-
ple. The term “illness” has been used in a wide significance, encompassing both 
general diseases and professional ones. A second feature of such right is the ade-
quacy of the healthcare treatment pursuant to several initiatives at the international 
level, like for example those carried out by the World Health Organization, the 
principles enclosed in the Ottawa Chart of 1986 aiming at equity in health. See 
Fernando Bocchini, Salute e sanità tra solidarietà e responsabilità, 1 CONTR. 
IMPR. 126 (2018) (arguing that protection of the human health is a significant ex-
perience of rebuilding the effectiveness of a legal system in order to erase the gap 
between theoretical declarations and the incongruity of real life, and stressing that 
the current interpretation of art. 32 Cost. tends to grants constitutional value to 
statutory provisions. As well, the regulations of the Consumer Code—i.e., De-
creto Legge, Sept. 6, 2005, n. 206—art. 2 (2) (a), points out among the fundamen-
tal rights granted to consumers and users “the right to health’s protection,” and 
that, pursuant to such provision, contractual terms aimed at limiting or excluding 
the liability of the professional party in the event of death or personal injury suf-
fered by the consumer as a consequence of an action or omission of the former 
are held unfair). 
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− The safety of healthcare is achieved also through the complex of 
all the activities aiming at the prevention and risk management 
connected to the issuance of healthcare services and the appro-
priate use of the structural, technological, and organizational re-
sources (art. 1, § 2).47 For this purpose, in every region of Italy, 
a center has been established for risk management and patient’s 
safety aimed at collecting from private and public healthcare in-
stitutions the data related to adverse events and malpractice liti-
gation. 
− Article 3 establishes a National Observatory of the good customs 
on safety in the healthcare system (Observatory) under the Na-
tional Agency for Regional Healthcare Services (AGENAS). 
The Observatory has the task:  
• to collect, from the regional centers above, the data re-
lated to risks and adverse events, as well as to causes, 
extent, frequency, and financial burden of the controver-
sies;  
• to draw up guidelines with the support of qualified sci-
entific associations; and  
• to identify appropriate measures in order to prevent and 
manage health-risk with the aim of monitoring the good 
customs, as well as for purposes of professional training, 
and continuing education of the healthcare providers. 
With reference to the professional activity of healthcare providers 
and their liability, art. 5 sets forth specific rules according to which 
                                                                                                             
 47. In this regard, see Matteo Caputo, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente 
la professione sanitaria dopo la L. n. 24 del 2017… “quo vadit”? Primi dubbi, 
prime risposte, secondi dubbi, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 293, 297 (2017) (ar-
guing that the emphasis on healthcare’s safety rather than on the right to health in 
itself, is aimed at stressing the absence of a duty upon the professional to ensure 
the patient’s healing. The former would therefore be obliged to apply the required 
professional diligence but could not be held liable for not having achieved the 
patient’s recovery). See also Adolfo di Majo, Il giudizio di responsabilità civile 
del medico dopo la legge Gelli e cioè la perizia “guidata,” 4 GIUR. IT. 841 (2018) 
(arguing about the legal effects of the criminal provisions of the 2017 Law within 
the civil law’s field, and stressing the nature of obbligazione di mezzi (obligation 
of means) charged upon the healthcare provider). 
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healthcare providers executing health services for prevention, diag-
nostic, therapeutic, palliative, rehabilitation, and forensic medicine 
purposes comply with the recommendations of the guidelines drawn 
up by qualified selected scientific institutions and published pursu-
ant to the procedure set forth in the same article, except for the pe-
culiarities of the single case. In case of absence of the above-men-
tioned guidelines, health care professionals abide by good clinical 
care practices. However, such behavioral duty must be tailored to 
the specific case. If the peculiar circumstances of the case require a 
different approach and/or behavior, the healthcare professional 
shall, on a justified basis, depart from the above-mentioned recom-
mendations.48 Consequently, exceptions to the general rule can be 
allowed with reference to the peculiarities of the single case. 
In particular, the institutions referred to in art. 5 are included in 
a list compiled and updated by the Ministry of Health. The guide-
lines and updates are integrated within the sistema nazionale per le 
linee guida.49 A further public entity operating under the Ministry 
of Health, namely the Istituto superiore di sanità (ISS) is involved. 
Indeed, the ISS, before publishing such guidelines on its websites, 
shall previously verify (i) the compliance of the adopted methodol-
ogy with a specified public standard, as well as (ii) the relevance of 
scientific evidences declared in support of the recommendations. 
Accordingly, the framework outlined by the 2017 Law is quite com-
plex and involves different stakeholders, both private and public, 
called to actively cooperate to the development of the national sys-
tem of guidelines. Furthermore, the entities operating under the su-
pervision of the Ministry of Health and its related agencies play a 
fundamental role in selecting and verifying which guidelines should 
be included in the system and must be complied with by healthcare 
professionals. 
                                                                                                             
 48. Therefore, the approach adopted is that of “comply or explain.” See 
Caputo, supra note 47, at 295. 
 49. SNLG, DELL’ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ, https://perma.cc/48MH-
4T9Y.  
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In addition, unlike the Balduzzi Law, the 2017 Law introduces 
a hierarchical distinction between CPGs and good clinical practices. 
In particular, the CPGs provided with the preeminent role granted 
by such provision, are only those officially accredited and published 
pursuant to the 2017 Law. The good clinical practices will come at 
stake only when the first lacks, and they might also encompass 
CPGs issued by (reliable) entities, but not (yet) accredited in the of-
ficial system depicted by the 2017 Law.50 
Article 6 specifically deals with criminal liability of healthcare 
providers, introducing a new provision in the Italian Criminal Code: 
art. 590-sexies (fault liability for death or personal injuries in the 
healthcare field). According to this article, if death or personal inju-
ries occur within the exercise of healthcare professional activity, the 
healthcare providers will be punished pursuant to arts. 589 and 590 
C.p.,51 except for situations specified in art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p. 
In fact, pursuant to the second paragraph of this provision, should 
death or personal injury occur because of unskillfulness, punish-
ment52 is excluded when the recommendations set forth by the offi-
cially published CPGs—or, absent such guidelines, the good clinical 
                                                                                                             
 50. For critical remarks about the role of good clinical practices within mal-
practice trials (in particular when invoked by the defendant in a criminal judg-
ment), see Francesco D’Alessandro, La responsabilità penale del sanitario alla 
luce della riforma “Gelli-Bianco,” 5 DIR. PEN. PROC. 572, 578 (2017). 
 51. The articles respectively provide for manslaughter and personal injury. 
 52. The literal expression adopted by art. 6 of the 2017 Law related to art. 
590-sexies C.p. is punibilità. Pursuant to the Italian Criminal Code and from a 
strictly technical perspective, the “cause di estinzione della punibilità” are cir-
cumstances excluding the liability of the defendant although all the constitutive 
elements of the crime have been met. FERRANDO MANTOVANI, I DIRITTO PENALE, 
PARTE GENERALE 786 et seq. (9th ed., CEDAM 2015). However, the expression 
has been used even in different meanings and its theoretical conceptualization has 
not been properly built. Id. at 798. Yet, as constantly highlighted by Italian judges 
(lastly by the Tarabori holding, Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 20, 2017-June 7, 2017, 
n. 28187 [hereinafter Tarabori]—and authoritatively by the Supreme Court in the 
Mariotti case, Cass., sez. Unite Penali, Dec. 21, 2017-Feb. 22, 2018, n. 8770 
[hereinafter Mariotti] see infra, § IV, the Italian lawmaker in recent times adopted 
the term punibilità in several, non-technical, and improper meanings, to express 
different concepts; for example, criminal liability in general, or other circum-
stances able to exclude, even from a subjective point of view, the penalty. Ac-
cordingly, reference to exclusion of punibilità ought not to necessarily be intended 
as implying a proper condition for the exclusion of the punishment. Pursuant to 
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practices—have been complied with, as long as the recommenda-
tions above proved to be adequate to the peculiarities of the case. 
Article 7 deals with civil liability of both the healthcare institu-
tion and the healthcare providers. In particular, solving problems of 
proper qualification of the nature of the liabilities above, it draws a 
distinction between the institution, on the one side, and the 
healthcare professional, on the other.53 Indeed, the institution that, 
in order to perform its obligation, avails itself of the activity of 
healthcare providers, is contractually liable because of the inten-
tional or negligent behavior of these professionals according to arts. 
1218 and 1228 C.c. The liability of the structure has a contractual 
nature and it is legally grounded on the direct liability of the institu-
tion towards the patient combined with elements of its vicarious li-
ability.54 
The healthcare provider is liable under art. 2043 C.c., unless she 
has performed in execution of a contractual relationship with the pa-
tient. This being the exception, the general rule is that the healthcare 
provider is liable towards the patient under tort law. The distinction 
above affects, in particular, the procedural burden of proof, heavier 
for the patient in case of tortious liability pursuant to art. 2043 C.c.,55 
                                                                                                             
the Tarabori Court, the term at stake shall therefore be intended as non-technical 
reference to the process of assessing the liability of the defendant in light of the 
degree of the fault (see Tarabori, supra note 52, § 10.1). Since there is no consen-
sus among courts and among scholars about the proper qualification of the term 
punibilità within art. 590-sexies C.p., in the present essay it has been translated 
into “punishment,” thereby referring to the element of the sanction pursuant to the 
concept of punibilità encompassed within the Criminal Code, although being 
aware of the possible non-technical meaning of such expression. 
 53. See, e.g,, Roberto Pardolesi, Chi (vince e chi) perde nella riforma della 
responsabilità sanitaria, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 261, 264 (2017) (arguing 
that the 2017 Law has introduced a “dual-track” system of remedies); Giuseppe 
Pavich, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente la professione sanitaria: cosa 
cambia con la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7-8 CASS. PEN. 2961 (2017) (expressing critical 
remarks about the distinction between different kinds of liability). 
 54. Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 728-729; Massimo Franzoni, 
Colpa e linee guida nella nuova legge, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 271, 273 
l(2017). 
 55. Generally, in case of tortious liability, the patient or, more broadly, the 
victim shall prove (i) the damage; (ii) the intentional or negligent behavior of the 
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and liberative prescription, which amounts to 5 years in case of tor-
tious liability, and 10 years in case of contractual liability. 
In particular, art. 7 of the 2017 Law refers to three different sit-
uations: (1) the patient chooses a private practice physician, (2) the 
patient refers to a public or private hospital and is treated by a phy-
sician employed there; and (3) the patient avails herself of the pro-
fessional activity of her general practitioner or of a physician em-
ployed by a public or private institution, but allowed to practice pri-
vately within the institution itself.56 In the first and in the third case, 
the relationship between the physician and the patient is governed 
by the law of contracts.57 The second case used to qualify as con-
tractual too on the basis of the doctrine of contatto sociale (i.e., a de 
                                                                                                             
alleged tortfeasor; (iii) the element of causation between (i) and (ii); (iv) the un-
lawful nature of the damage (i.e., the harm to a legally protected interest, see 
Brüggemeier, supra note 22, at 4, 7-8). On the contrary, under a contractual lia-
bility regime, the victim shall prove (i) the existence of a contractual relationship 
with the other party; (ii) the breach of the contractual obligation by the other party; 
and (iii) the damage; consequently, it will be up to the alleged breaching party to 
demonstrate that nonfeasance or improper performance is not due to her fault. 
However, such general rules have been affected by the judicial interpretation and 
evolution. 
 56.  See, e.g., Ubaldo Perfetti, La responsabilità civile del medico tra legge 
cd. Gelli e nuova disciplina del consenso informato, 2 GIUST. CIV. 359 (2018). 
 57. With regard to the first and third case, the new rules do not change the 
previous judicial achievements, particularly with reference to the burden of proof. 
Such rule indeed shall be tailored with the case when the obligation undertaken 
by the professional is an obbligazione di risultato (obligation of result) whereby 
the professional guarantees a specific result or, on the contrary, whether it is an 
obbligazione di mezzi (obligation of means) whereby the same guarantees to apply 
her best care, though not ensuring any results. Such distinction affects the relevant 
burden of proof. Pursuant to art. 1218 C.c., in the first case it is up to the debtor 
to prove that the nonfeasance is due to force majeure, whilst in the second case it 
is up to the creditor to prove the negligence and the breach of the duty of care by 
the debtor. Traditionally, the obligation of the physician used to be an obligation 
of means. See, e.g., Gaetano E. Napoli, La responsabilità sanitaria nel sistema 
civilistico. Punti fermi e nuove linee di riforma, 1 RESP. CIV. PREV. 103, 112-113 
(2017). However, such qualification has been criticized by many authors arguing 
that the distinction above has only descriptive value and lacks any prescriptive 
force, and it has been subject to a progressive judicial evolution, culminating with 
the holding of the Supreme Court, July 28, 2005, n. 15781 arguing that every 
obligation requires at the same time the coexistence of the debtor’s behavior to-
gether with a result, although in variable proportion, and thus affirming that the 
evidentiary mechanism is the same in any case of alleged breach of contractual 
obligation. A further judicial attack to the relevance of the distinction above has 
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facto relationship between the physician and the patient giving rise 
to legal obligations according to art. 1173 C.c.). However, due to the 
2017 Law, it is now governed by the law of torts.58 
                                                                                                             
been carried out with the recognition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, distinguish-
ing between routine and non-routine interventions. In particular, the ease of the 
intervention and/or its routine-nature imply the reversal of the burden of proof up 
to the professional charged with the demonstration that the unsuccessful result is 
not due to her fault. See Giovanni Pascuzzi, Malpractice: la colpa del medico è 
presunta se l’intervento è di “facile esecuzione,” in 1 LEX AQUILIA - LA 
RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 16 (Giovanni Pascuzzi ed., Zanichelli 2005). Subse-
quently, such distinction has been abandoned on the assumption that the risk-al-
location cannot be linked to the difficulty of the intervention and the tribunals 
used to require by the professionals the proof of an event beyond their control and 
not reasonably predictable and/or avoidable. See, e.g., Claudio Scognamiglio, 
Regole di condotta, modelli di responsabilità e risarcimento del danno nella 
nuova legge sulla responsabilità sanitaria, 6 CORR. GIUR. 740, 741-744 (2017). 
Furthermore, Italian courts used to apply the rule of the so called “proximity of 
the evidence” whereby the relevant burden shall be charged to the breaching party 
because this party possesses the elements to paralyze the creditor’s claim, see Su-
preme Court, Joint Civil Division, Oct. 20, 2001, n. 13533. As for the specific 
area of medical malpractice, the rule of proximity of the evidence is interpreted 
in the sense that the patient alleging the professional’s nonfeasance shall demon-
strate the existence of the contract with the hospital or the healthcare institution 
together with the source of the contatto sociale with the physician, and then it is 
up to the defendant to prove the absence of any fault in the contractual perfor-
mance. Such shift in the burden of proof has been identified among the factors 
increasing medical malpractice claims, on one side, and the practice of defensive 
medicine on the other, even after the enactment of the Balduzzi Law. Indeed, as 
above mentioned, despite the express characterization in such Law of the 
healthcare professional’s liability as tortious, Italian courts carried on in affirming 
its contractual nature thus applying such evidentiary rules. For critical remarks, 
see Giovanna Visintini, La colpa medica nella responsabilità civile, 3 CONTR. 
IMPR. 530 (2015). On the contrary, the 2017 Law straightforwardly affirms the 
tortious nature of the physician if employed by a public or private healthcare in-
stitution, and not involved in a pre-existing contractual relationship with the pa-
tient; and vice versa, should a contractual relationship occur between the patient 
and the healthcare provider, the latter would be judged on the basis of the above-
mentioned contractual rules. 
 58. The characterization of the healthcare professional’s liability as tortious 
implies, on one side, the compensation of even not predictable damages pursuant 
to art. 2056 C.c., and, on the other, the application of the regime provided for by 
art. 2050 C.c. if the relevant requirements are met. Such a norm deals with liability 
due to the exercise of dangerous activities (art 2050 C.c.—Liability arising from 
the exercise of dangerous activities: “Whoever causes injury to another in the per-
formance of an activity dangerous by its nature or by reason of the instrumentali-
ties employed, is liable in damages, unless she proves to have taken all suitable 
measures to avoid the injury”). The range of application of this article has been 
investigated by the doctrine and the Italian courts under two different aspects. The 
first issue dealt with the nature of such liability: currently, the majority view de-
scribes it as strict liability whilst, according to a minority opinion, the norm would 
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Furthermore, non-pecuniary damage suffered by the patient 
shall be compensated referring to thresholds and parameters set 
forth in the charts outlined by arts. 138 and 139 of the Code of Pri-
vate Insurance.59 Finally, art. 7 clarifies that the provisions above 
are mandatory.  
The Balduzzi law affirmed the tortious nature of medical liabil-
ity, leaving the burden of proof on the plaintiff. However, as previ-
ously indicated,60 this clear legislative choice did not prevent Italian 
courts to carry on adjudicating that the professional had a contrac-
tual relationship with the patient, in particular if employed by a 
healthcare institution: liability ended up being contractual and the 
burden of proof was consequently reallocated. Therefore, in light of 
the clash between the Balduzzi qualification of professional liability 
as tortious, and the judicial interpretation of this liability as contrac-
tual, the emphasis of art. 7 in clarifying the mandatory nature of the 
                                                                                                             
give rise to a mere rebuttable presumption of liability upon the party exercising a 
dangerous activity. As known, the strict liability characterization affects the rele-
vant burden of proof in favor of the victim. The second issue dealt with the pos-
sibility to include the healthcare activities within the category of “dangerous ac-
tivities” encompassed by such article. The answer given by the judicial formant 
is affirmative because, besides the list of dangerous activities filled in by specific 
Laws or other normative provisions, Italian courts admit the possibility to include 
other atypical activities on a quam in concreto basis, to be therefore assessed case 
by case. Such extensive orientation is also upheld by authoritative statutory prec-
edents, in particular art. 15 of the Privacy Code according to which “whoever 
causes a damage as effect of the personal data processing shall compensate such 
damage pursuant to art. 2050 C.c.” Consequently, for the purposes of Italian law, 
the personal data processing is deemed a dangerous activity. See Perfetti, supra 
note 56, § 10. 
 59. See Decreto Legislativo Sept. 7, 2005, n. 209. With regard to the com-
pensation of damage, the express reference to the thresholds set forth in the Code 
of Private Insurance has been interpreted in a double sense: on one side, in light 
of the legislative will to put a cap on damages and, on the other, in light of the 
need to personalize and tailor the assessment of damages, as commonly applied 
in the insurance field, but with a peculiar feature. In the case of the insurance, the 
criteria to personalize the damage even increasing it up to the triple, are exclu-
sively focused on the victim; on the contrary, in the healthcare field what matters 
for the purposes of decreasing or increasing the amount of damages is the profes-
sional behaviour of the healthcare provider and her level of compliance with the 
accredited CPGs or the good clinical practices. See Alpa, Ars Interpretandi, supra 
note 5, at 731.  
 60. See supra, § II. 
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provisions at stake seems aimed at definitively solving this herme-
neutical issue and avoiding any further different interpretations. 
The 2017 Law has been implemented by means of two Ministry 
of Health’s decrees addressing essential elements. In particular, the 
first decree points out the list of accredited scientific associations 
and technical-scientific associations of the healthcare professions,61 
while the second establishes the above-mentioned Observatory of 
the good clinical practices on healthcare safety.62 
Since the task of elaborating the relevant guidelines, pursuant to 
the scheme drawn up by the 2017 Law, pertains to public and private 
entities, as well as to scientific and technical-scientific associations 
of the healthcare professions purposely included in a public list, the 
first decree points out the criteria to be included in the list of selected 
entities. The list will be updated on a two-year basis. In order to be 
included in such list, associations shall demonstrate to have: 
− national relevance, namely to have a direct or indirect branch or 
subsidiary within at least 12 Regions; 
− representativeness of at least 30% of professionals (who are not 
retired) of the specific field of expertise; 
− proved independence from entrepreneurial activities and lack of 
profit-making purposes; 
− compliance with the duty to publish the scientific activity of the 
association on its website, to be constantly updated; 
− absence of wage for the company’s officer positions; 
− among the entity’s purposes, lack of the aim to provide labor-
union assistance to its members and absence of any direct or in-
direct labor-union activity; and 
− broadest participation of the members to the activities and deci-
sions of the association. 
                                                                                                             
 61. Decreto Aug. 2, 2017, G.U. n. 186. 
 62. Decreto Sept. 29, 2017, G.U. n. 248. 
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The requirements above are, therefore, quite strict63 and should 
the association subsequently lose one or more of them, it might be 
first suspended and then erased from the list.  
The second decree establishes the Observatory within the 
AGENAS. As previously mentioned, the Observatory is called to 
carry out, in accordance to the directions of healthcare planning as 
defined by the Ministry of Health, very important tasks, in particular 
dealing with the collection of statistical data, drawing up of CPGs, 
and risk-management activities. Both decrees play an important role 
with reference to the criminal liability of the healthcare provider. In 
particular, the first decree concurs to select and outline the sources 
of reference for the behavior of the healthcare professionals (and, 
from a different perspective, concurs to select and outline the stand-
ard of behavior to be adopted by judges when assessing their liabil-
ity). Worthy of attention is the fact that healthcare professionals 
shall comply with the sole recommendations set forth by the guide-
lines published in accordance with the 2017 Law and drafted by the 
accredited institutions. 
The 2017 Law has apparently deprived first the physicians and 
then the courts of the power to evaluate the reliability and credibility 
of the guidelines.64 This, in the majority of the opinions, has repre-
sented a worthy effort to avoid uncertainties arising from the large 
number of available guidelines, not all of the same value,65 and to 
interrupt the recourse to “posthumous” identification of guidelines. 
                                                                                                             
 63. On Oct. 23, 2017, the Ministry of Health issued an official circular in 
order to clarify the doubts arisen about the proper interpretation of the require-
ments above and their range of application. 
 64. Cristiano Cupelli, L’eterointegrazione della legge Gelli-Bianco: 
aggiornamenti in tema di linee guida “certificate” e responsabilità penale in 
ambito sanitario, 10 DIR. PEN. CONT. 266, 268 (2017). 
 65. See, ex multis, Carlo Scorretti, Le linee guida nella medicina moderna e 
nella recente normativa italiana, in RESPONSABILITÀ E LINEE GUIDA 103-114 
(Gian Marco Caletti et al. eds., EPG Udine 2018). See also Justin Kung et al., 
Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute of Medicine Standards, 
172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1628 (2012) (focusing on the problem of con-
flict of interests among the members of the entities called to issue CPGs and 
providing statistical data about such phenomenon). 
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This used to be a strategy developed under the dominion of the pre-
vious legal regime (i.e., the Balduzzi Law).66 The express duty to 
abide by existing, published, and clearly identified CPGs, puts an 
end to this strategy. Furthermore, the ex-ante perspective is im-
portant because it takes into account all potential recipients and ben-
eficiaries, and not just the injured parties or the parties involved in a 
trial. As highlighted, art. 5 of the 2017 Law introduces a general rule 
requiring the compliance with the accredited guidelines working 
both in the area of civil (and, for certain purposes, criminal) liability 
as a criterion to assess the skillfulness of the physician and for the 
quantification of damages.  
A further aim of the new law is to avoid uncertainties due to the 
reliability of the scientific association involved as well as conflicts 
among different and inconsistent recommendations. The process of 
controlled selection of guidelines to be included in the national of-
ficial database immediately carries out a distinction between reliable 
and not-reliable guidelines (at least for the purposes of the 2017 
Law). Finally, the new system should solve the issue of conflict of 
interests among stakeholders and guidelines’ issuers affecting the 
reliability of clinical guidelines as well. 
IV. JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY 
To summarize, the 2017 Law, by introducing a rebuttable pre-
sumption of lack of punishment, not only opened new and signifi-
cant issues in respect to the previous legislative regulation, but it 
seems to have failed the task of ensuring the certainty of lack of 
liability in cases of compliance with the officially accredited CPGs. 
Indeed, the 2017 Law, according to the majority of commentators 
and to a significant judicial orientation, appears less favorable to 
healthcare providers than the Balduzzi Law.67 
                                                                                                             
 66. See supra, § II. 
 67. See Tarabori and Mariotti rulings, supra note 52, and relevant comments. 
See also Cristiano Cupelli, L’art. 590-sexies C.p. nelle motivazioni delle sezioni 
unite: un’interpretazione costituzionalmente conforme dell’imperizia medica 
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The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to deal with the 
2017 Law was the Tarabori case.68 In this case, the Fourth Criminal 
Division of the Supreme Court highlights the functions of art. 5, 
which “entails a real foundation of the ways to exercise of healthcare 
professions.”69 Within such a system, the guidelines are intended as 
“general directives that shall face the peculiarities of each case, and 
shall adapt themselves to it.”70 In particular, the Tarabori holding 
points out “the clear legislative intention to build up an institutional 
public system aimed at regulating the healthcare activities, able to 
ensure their development in a uniform and appropriate manner, in 
compliance with controlled scientific evidences” in order to “over-
rule uncertainties that occurred after the enactment of the Balduzzi 
Law with reference to the criteria to properly identify the scientifi-
cally qualified directives,”71 as well as to avoid the dangers of de-
generations due to guidelines affected by conflict of interest or not 
scientifically grounded. This is done “[i]n order to foster the uniform 
application of accredited and virtuous directives.”72 
As noted by the Supreme Court, the legislative choice not only 
guarantees “to the healthcare institution, the governance of the med-
ical profession,” but it also “has a significant impact on the profes-
sional who must comply with the recommendations although with 
the adaptations required by each case” and is “legitimately entitled 
                                                                                                             
(ancora) punibile, DIR. PEN. CONT. Mar. 1, 2018 (arguing that the 2017 Law has 
failed its alleged purposes); Pier Francesco Poli, Il D.D.L. Gelli-Bianco: verso 
un’ennesima occasione persa di adeguamento della responsabilità penale del 
medico ai principi costituzionali?, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 67 (2017) (expressing 
several critical remarks to the 2017 Law). But see also Gian Marco Caletti & 
Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, Una prima lettura della legge “Gelli-Bianco” 
nella prospettiva del diritto penale, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 84 (2017) (pointing out 
some positive elements of the 2017 Law). 
 68. See Tarabori, supra note 52. 
 69. See id. § 7.5 (analyzing the effects of the 2017 Law from a wider perspec-
tive, encompassing both the domain of criminal liability and that of civil liability, 
see also § 7.4, as linked by the overall approach adopted by such Law). 
 70. Id. § 7.5. 
 71. The Court expressly argues that, under the Balduzzi Law, the CPGs 
counted as scientific directives for the healthcare provider and their compliance 
amounted to a “protective shield” against unjustified claims. Id. § 6. 
 72. Id. § 7.5. 
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to rely on the fact that her behavior shall be assessed pursuant to the 
same recommendations she must abide by.”73 In light of such re-
marks, the Supreme Court infers that the system introduced by the 
2017 Law “provides an unprecedented regulatory framework, fo-
cused on the modalities of execution of the healthcare profession 
and of the assessment of negligence,” which offers to the judge “pre-
cise directions in order to evaluate the liability of the provider.”74  
In particular, the holding points out the paradoxical conse-
quences of a literal interpretation of the norm, according to which a 
physician (or any other healthcare professional) could escape liabil-
ity even though she caused harm to the patient if it is demonstrated 
that the physician acted in compliance with qualified directives.75 
The Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court has, thus, 
deemed that the text of art. 590-sexies C.p., as introduced within the 
Penal Code by art. 6 of the 2017 Law, is affected by “obvious” traits 
and by a “logical incompatibility” with the overall rationale of the 
provision itself, as well as with the general principles of the Italian 
legal system.  
In brief, according to the Court, a literal interpretation of the ar-
ticle would make it unconstitutional. The paradigmatic example of-
fered by the Court is the case of a surgeon planning and executing, 
in compliance with the relevant clinical guidelines, an operation for 
the removal of an abdominal neoplasm, who, in the executive mo-
ment, due to a huge and tragic mistake, severs an artery rather than 
the peduncle of the neoplasm, thus causing the death of the patient. 
In the opinion of the Court, following the literal interpretation of the 
provision at stake would lead to exclude the surgeon’s liability. Ac-
cordingly, since the outcome would be unfair and unlawful because 
it would amount to a breach of the right to health set forth in art. 32 
of the Italian Constitution, and would negatively affect civil claims 
of medical malpractice and the related compensation of damage, as 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. § 8.2. 
 74. Id. § 7.5.  
 75. Id. § 7.4. 
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well as the constitutional principle of equality set forth in art. 3 (be-
cause the legal regime applied to healthcare professionals would be 
“irrationally” different than that applied to other equally risky and 
difficult professions), this interpretation was rejected by the Court.76 
In light of the above reasoning, the sole interpretation allowed by 
the “unhappy” lexical phrasing of the 2017 Law is that, when it is a 
matter of unskillful behavior, the healthcare provider77 shall not be 
held liable if she complied with the officially accredited guidelines 
and there were no reasons to depart from them. 
Consequently, the Tarabori Court, emphasizing the purposes of 
the 2017 Law and particularly the new system of accredited guide-
lines, holds that the physician complying with the accredited guide-
lines, save the peculiarities of each case, is entitled to expect that her 
behavior will be judged pursuant to the same clinical guidelines.78 
Therefore, for the purposes of the new art. 590-sexies C.p., the as-
sessment of liability shall be carried out taking into account the in-
volved clinical guidelines, which must be pertinent and whose reli-
ability and adequacy to the specific case shall be previously investi-
gated by the judge, called to focus this assessment upon the moment 
of implementation of the guidelines by the healthcare professional. 
Within the described range of application, the healthcare provider is 
consequently entitled to be judged pursuant to the standard set by 
the same guidelines she shall comply with. 
Accordingly, the role of CPGs as drawn up by both art. 5. and 
art. 6 of the 2017 Law ends up to be neglected because any “auto-
matic” waiver of liability (or any “protective shield”) generated by 
the compliance with the officially accredited guidelines, is denied. 
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. 
 77. The 2017 Law, as pointed out, deals with the liability of the healthcare 
provider in general. However, all the three holdings of the Supreme Court address 
the case of medical malpractice and liability of the physician, thus referring their 
reasoning to the latter category. Nevertheless, except for the peculiarities of each 
healthcare profession, the interpretation provided by the Court applies to 
healthcare providers in general. 
 78. See Tarabori, supra note 52, § 8.2. 
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A confirmation of such effect can be found in the fact that, in com-
paring the Balduzzi regime with that of the 2017 Law for inter-tem-
porary purposes related to the principle of non-retroactivity of the 
criminal provision, the Tarabori Court found the Balduzzi Law more 
favorable to healthcare providers than the 2017 Law.  
Four months after the Tarabori ruling, the Fourth Criminal Di-
vision (with a different composition) dealt again with the 2017 Law 
and, in particular, with art. 590-sexies C.p. However, the Court em-
braced a completely different interpretation and never mentioned the 
earlier ruling.79 The Cavazza holding points out that the specific 
field of application of art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p. is that of the un-
skilled execution of proper and adequate clinical guidelines.80 Con-
sequently, the so-called imperitia in executivis would shield the 
healthcare provider from criminal liability, while the imperitia in 
eligendo, namely the incorrect selection of the guideline or the adop-
tion of a non-adequate guideline, would lead to affirm her criminal 
liability.81 This is the rule set forth by the holding at stake, which is 
reached through an articulated ratio decidendi.  
 First of all, the Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court, 
sitting with different judges than those of the Tarabori holding, high-
lights what the elements of certainty introduced by the 2017 Law 
are: first, the specific abrogation of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law, to-
gether with the consequent overtaking of the issue of the degree of 
fault; second, the clear legislative choice to apply the waiver of lia-
bility set forth in the second paragraph of art. 590-sexies C.p. only 
to the event of unskillfulness (thus, excluding from its range of ap-
plication cases of negligence and carelessness).82 
On the contrary, among the controversial elements of the 2017 
Law, the Court stresses the role of CPGs as outlined by the 
lawmaker. It points to the operational difficulties in distinguishing 
                                                                                                             
 79. Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct. 19-31, 2017, n. 50078 [hereinafter Cavazza]. 
 80. Id. § 7. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 6. 
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between unskillfulness, negligence, and carelessness, since these 
concepts are adjoining and often overlapping. It insists that in a case 
of gross fault, it would be extremely difficult to find that the 
circumstances to release the physician from liability, as set forth by 
the art. 590-sexies C.p., are fulfilled.83 
Consequently, in order to avoid the highlighted issues—and to 
save the rationale of the 2017 Law—the Cavazza Court provides an 
interpretation aimed at enhancing as much as possible the letter and 
the purposes of this law. In particular, in the opinion of the Court, 
the clear intent of the 2017 Law is to avoid any differences in the 
degree of fault in the event of harm due to unskillfulness of the 
healthcare provider. Consequently, when the requirements of art. 
590-sexies, para 2 C.p. are fulfilled, even the gross fault shall be 
excused.84 In addition, pursuant to this interpretation, the intent of 
the 2017 Law is to specifically favor the position of the physician 
by decreasing the possibility of a criminal liability, without preju-
dice to civil liability, thereby ensuring to patients the compensation 
of the suffered damages.85  
The keystone of the new regime are the accredited CPGs and the 
mandatory requirement for healthcare professionals to comply with 
them or, in the absence thereof, with the good clinical customs, pro-
vided that both prove to be adequate to the circumstances of the spe-
cific case. Accordingly, the “causa di non punibilità,” as outlined 
by the Court, loses any subjective connotations to assume an objec-
tive feature: 
[T]he surrender to sanction the physician is justified in light 
of the lawmaker’s choice not to mortify the initiative of the 
professional because of the fear of unfair retaliations, thus 
discharging the physician from punishment in reason of a 
mere judgment of criminal policy’s opportunity in order to 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. § 7.  
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restore the operational serenity of the physician and thereby 
preventing the phenomenon of defensive medicine.86 
Therefore, in the sole case of unskillfulness, criminal liability 
will hinge on the adequacy of the accredited guidelines: should these 
guidelines be held adequate, the physician would not incur criminal 
liability even in cases of gross unskillfulness. On the contrary, 
should the guidelines be held not appropriate to the circumstances 
of the case, the physician will be found liable even in cases of slight 
unskillfulness. However, it has been also stressed by the Court that 
the physician’s unskilled behavior will be excused only if the mis-
take occurred in the execution of the appropriate guideline. On the 
contrary, should the mistake occur ab initio in the selection of the 
guideline, liability will be maintained. Finally, pointing out the pos-
itive effects of the new provisions, the Cavazza Court did not seem 
to doubt the constitutionality of the 2017 Law.  
The two holdings differ from each other, adopting opposite in-
terpretations of the 2017 Law. The Cavazza Court highlighted the 
purpose of this law in light of the announced intent of the lawmaker 
to provide a “safe harbor” to healthcare providers vis-a-vis the mal-
practice claims in cases of unskillful behavior. In order to reach such 
aim, the Court emphasized the letter of the 2017 Law and, in partic-
ular, of art. 590-sexies C.p. deeming that both cases of slight and 
gross unskillfulness (in the execution of proper guidelines) shall dis-
charge the healthcare provider from criminal liability, although 
without prejudice to the civil liability. Accordingly, the Court has 
stressed the determinant role played by CPGs to release from liabil-
ity the professionals who abide by them, insofar as they prove to be 
adequate to the specific case.  
However, the Cavazza interpretation raises issues as to the com-
patibility of the new provisions with, in particular, the principle of 
equality and the fundamental right to health, as respectively set forth 
in arts. 3 and 32 of the Italian Constitution. To avoid a possible clash 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id.  
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with constitutional norms, the Tarabori Court provided an interpre-
tation so strict as to deprive the 2017 Law of its (alleged) innovative 
potential. Pursuant to this ruling, the liability waiver regime 
grounded upon the system of accredited CPGs tended to be disre-
garded. Therefore, the interpretation adopted by the Tarabori Court 
has been qualified as interpretatio abrogans.87 
In addition, from the perspective of the Tarabori holding, the 
Balduzzi Law is more favorable than the 2017 Law. On the contrary, 
according to the Cavazza holding, the result of the comparison is 
exactly the opposite: this clash would lead to antithetical outcomes 
in cases involving inter-temporary matters in light of the principles 
of non-retroactivity of the criminal law, and retroactivity of the more 
favorable provisions derived from art. 2 C.p. and art. 25 of the Italian 
Constitution. 
The crucial importance of the issue, and the clear conflict of in-
terpretations about the letter of the 2017 Law arisen within the 
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court, urged the interven-
tion of the Joint Criminal Division in order to clarify the meaning 
and the range of application of this law and aimed at providing the 
lower courts, the Italian society, and the whole public of stakehold-
ers with an authentic interpretation of the 2017 Law (namely of the 
art. 590-sexies C.p. as introduced by art. 6 of the 2017 Law). 
In the Mariotti holding,88 the Joint Criminal Division of the Su-
preme Court offered a third and different interpretation of the pro-
visions. In the opinion of the Court: (i) the Tarabori Court upholds 
an interpretatio abrogans of the 2017 Law clashing with the clear 
intent of the law and with the previous judicial achievements; (ii) 
the Cavazza Court grants a too broad range of application to the 
waiver of liability system set forth by the 2017 Law, therefore rais-
ing constitutional issues of the law in light of the principles of equal-
ity among professionals (art. 3) and protection of the patient’s health 
                                                                                                             
 87. See Mariotti supra, note 52. 
 88. Id.  
2018] ITALY 403 
 
 
 
(art. 32). The Joint Division in the Mariotti ruling affirms that the 
release of the healthcare professional from liability occurs when the 
harmful event is caused by the slight unskillfulness of the profes-
sional during the execution of the adequate accredited guidelines.89 
On the contrary, gross unskillfulness will not discharge from liabil-
ity, in order to avoid any discrimination with the liability regime of 
other professionals and to avoid any charge of unconstitutionality of 
the 2017 Law.90 The milestone of the present ruling is, therefore, the 
concept of “slight unskillfulness.”91 However, it is noteworthy that 
the 2017 Law does not mention at all the term slight and does not 
make any references to the degree of the unskilled behavior.  
Pursuant to the Court, the degree of fault in the form of the un-
skillfulness is justified in light of three main reasons. First, because 
of art. 2236 C.c. that specifically distinguishes between slight and 
                                                                                                             
 89. In the opinion of the Court, CPGs are not a shield against any kind of 
liability, since their value and legal effects depend upon their proved suitability to 
the peculiar circumstances of the specific case. Pursuant to the Court, then, such 
freedom of assessment granted to the healthcare provider, is aimed at preserving 
the professional’s autonomy, thus avoiding any “bureaucratic flattering out.” 
Therefore, the formalization of the leges artis would amount to a cultural change 
occurred in a new socio-professional context where the complex of expertise and 
know-how of the individual becomes a shared asset of the whole scientific com-
munity. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3. 
 90. The principle expressed by the Mariotti Court is: 
The healthcare provider is liable on the basis of fault for the manslaugh-
ter or personal injuries deriving from the performance of a medical-sur-
gical activity: 
a) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’) 
due to carelessness or imprudence; 
b) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’) 
due to the unskillful behavior when the specific case is not governed by 
the recommendations of the CPGs or of the good clinical practices; 
c) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’) 
due to the unskillful behavior in the selection and choice of CPGs or 
good clinical practices which are not adequate to the peculiar circum-
stances of the case; 
d) if the event occurred as a consequence of gross negligence due to the 
unskillful behavior in implementing the recommendations of adequate 
CPGs or good clinical practices, taking into account both the level of risk 
to manage and the specific technical difficulties of the medical act. 
See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 11. 
 91. Id. §§ 9, 10, 10.3 & 11. 
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gross negligence and that, although not directly applicable to crimi-
nal liability, yet underlies a general principle operating in the crim-
inal area as well, as held by the Italian Constitutional Court.92 Sec-
ond, because of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law that explicitly defined a 
spectrum of criminal fault.93 Third, because the preliminary drafts 
of the 2017 Law used to specifically distinguish between slight and 
gross unskillfulness. Therefore, the lack of the distinction in the of-
ficial draft of the 2017 Law ought to be ascribed to an unintentional 
omission of the lawmaker.94 
The second and the third reasons have been criticized because 
art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law has been expressly abrogated by art. 6 of 
the 2017 Law. Consequently, it seems difficult to argue that the cri-
teria of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law should still influence a regime 
that has clearly superseded this provision.95 These arguments have 
also been criticized because it is difficult to argue that the text of the 
2017 Law, currently in force, did not intend to exclude the degree of 
fault although such distinction lacks in its binding and official ver-
sion.96 
From a practical point of view, a further criticism to this inter-
pretation is the widely acknowledged difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. Consequently, 
these uncertainties might foster charges grounded on carelessness 
and negligence, thus bypassing the application of art. 590-sexies 
C.c. and its exegetical concerns: this would lead to an “escape” in 
the concepts of carelessness and negligence.97 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. §§ 9.2 & 10.1. 
 93. Id. §§ 8.2, 9.2 & 10.2. 
 94. Id. § 10.3. 
 95. See, e.g., Rocco Blaiotta, Niente resurrezioni, per favore. A proposito di 
S.U. Mariotti in tema di responsabilità medica, DIR. PEN. CONT. May 28, 2018, 
available at https://perma.cc/36LB-NKH5; Paolo Piras, Un distillato di 
nomofilachia: l’imperizia lieve intrinseca quale causa di non punibilità del 
medico, DIR. PEN. CONT. April, 20 2018, available at https://perma.cc 
/WUD7-6QU5 [hereinafter Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia]. 
 96. See Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia, supra note 95. 
 97. Cristiano Cupelli, La legge Gelli-Bianco e il primo vaglio della 
Cassazione: linee guida sì, ma con giudizio, 6 DIR. PEN. CONT. 280, 284 (2017). 
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Consequently, rather than referring the issue to the Constitu-
tional Court, as requested by the Attorney General in his conclusive 
remarks as well as by many commentators, the Joint Criminal Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court rewrote the text of the law by adding the 
term “slight.” According to some commentators, the text of the 2017 
Law was rewritten in malam partem because the interpretation rules 
that the gross unskillfulness is out of the range of application of art. 
590-sexies, para. 2 C.p., thus enlarging cases of liability.98 
In addition, the interpretation provided by the Mariotti holding 
does not eliminate the logical incompatibility, highlighted by the 
Tarabori Court, between compliance with the accredited guidelines 
and unskillful behavior. Consequently, as well summarized by a 
commentator, “unskillfulness in executivis:  
− pursuant to the Tarabori Court, non excusat: interpreta-
tio abrogans;  
− pursuant to the Cavazza Court, semper excusat: interpre-
tatio latissima;  
− pursuant to the Mariotti Court, excusat si levis: interpre-
tatio stricta.”99  
Furthermore, according to the Mariotti holding, which upholds 
the Tarabori’s remarks regarding this issue, the Balduzzi Law is 
more favorable than the 2017 Law. Thus, the Balduzzi Law shall be 
applied in cases involving matters of inter-temporary law.100 Should 
the Mariotti ruling be the final word regarding the 2017 Law, the 
Italian lawmaker would have missed the opportunity to reduce the 
area of criminal liability of the healthcare provider and decrease the 
practice of defensive medicine.101 
                                                                                                             
 98. Piras, supra note 95, at 10. 
 99. Id. at 4. 
 100. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 12. 
 101. For further comments to the Mariotti ruling, see, e.g., Gian Marco Caletti 
& Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, La fisionomia dell’art. 590-sexies C.p. dopo le 
Sezioni Unite tra nuovi spazi di graduazione dell’imperizia e “antiche” incertezze, 
4 DIR. PEN. CONT. 25 (2018); Roberto Bartoli, Riforma Gelli-Bianco e Sezioni 
Unite non placano il tormento: una proposta per limitare la colpa medica, 5 DIR. 
PEN. CONT. 233 (2018); Bartolomeo Romano, La responsabilità penale 
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It has been noted102 that, following the Mariotti holding, the 
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court might either decide 
to submit again the issue at stake at the Joint Division pursuant to 
art. 618 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure or to refer the 
issue of the unconstitutionality of the art. 590-sexies C.p. to the Con-
stitutional Court. Alternatively, Italian judges might decide to ad-
here to the Mariotti’s perspective, thus enhancing the role of art. 
2236 C.c. as an expression of a general principle operating even 
within the criminal matter.103 
In a subsequent case,104 the Fourth Criminal Division seems to 
have followed the third option. The case involved a neurologist 
charged with the death of a patient: a young woman died due to a 
syncope provoked by a severe arrhythmogenic heart disease. The 
neurologist was held liable for using the Tilt test in lieu of a 12-lead 
electrocardiogram (ECG). The latter exam would have allowed the 
doctor to properly identify the disease suffered by the patient, 
whereas the former was not adequate for this purpose. The absence 
of a prompt diagnosis prevented the appropriate treatment.  
The case provides the Fourth Division with the opportunity to 
recap the achievements about medical malpractice in light of the 
2017 Law and of the Joint Division’s judgment. First, the therapeu-
tic relationship between the physician and the patient implies the 
duty for the former to protect the life and the health of the latter. 
Second, ongoing medical science developments decrease the room 
for the individual dimension of the medical practice in favor of the 
standardized, multitasking, and multidisciplinary one. However, 
                                                                                                             
dell’esercente la professione sanitaria tra antichi dubbi e nuovi problemi, DIR. 
PEN. CONT. Nov. 16, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/ZRW4-ZMR8. 
 102. Piras, supra note 95, at 11. 
 103. See, e.g., Carlo Brusco, Responsabilità medica penale: le Sezioni Unite 
applicano le regole sulla responsabilità civile del prestatore d’opera, 5 DIR. PEN. 
PROC. 646 (2018). 
 104. Cass., sez. IV penale, Jan. 12-Apr. 5, 2018, n. 15718 [hereinafter Tessi-
tore]. 
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this assumption must be adapted to the principle of personal criminal 
liability.105  
Finally, the Court focuses on the role of clinical guidelines and 
their suitability to act as legal standard for the assessment of profes-
sional liability. In particular, moving from the previous holdings, the 
Court bestows such guidelines, and their proper selection and appli-
cation by the healthcare provider, with a determinant role, although 
excluding their binding nature as a legal standard.106 However, the 
element worth mentioning is the fact that the neurologist was held 
liable not on the ground of his unskillful behavior, but rather on the 
charge of negligence. Accordingly, the potential application of art. 
590-sexies C.p. has been ab origine excluded since unskillfulness 
was not involved. 
In light of this approach, the holding has been subject to critical 
remarks, first, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
“unskillful behavior” and “negligence” (and the fact that in this case 
the two concepts tended to overlap) and, second, because the risk of 
the (alleged) escape in the two different types of fault.107 
V. THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Although aimed at addressing from a broad perspective the pa-
tient-provider relationship as well as the topic of the professional’s 
liability, the 2017 Law does not specifically deal with the issue of 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. §§ 4.1-7.  
 106. Id. §§ 4.2-4.3-6. See also Lucia Risicato, Il nuovo statuto penale della 
colpa medica: un discutibile progresso nella valutazione della responsabilità del 
personale sanitario, LEGISLAZ. PEN. June 5, 2017, 1, 9 (expressing three critical 
remarks about the new legislative focus on accredited CPGs: first, because of the 
risks of a “medicine of State”; second, because of the inner limits of CPGs on one 
side and the peculiarities of the medical profession on the other; third, because the 
primary aim of the 2017 Law is the implementation of risk-management systems 
in order to decrease the expenditure of public resources: consequently, the rele-
vant CPGs for the purposes of the 2017 Law are not those exclusively aimed at 
the patient’s benefit, but those combining elements of cost-reduction too). 
 107. See Laura Anna Terrizzi, Linee guida e saperi scientifici “interferenti”: 
la Cassazione continua a non applicare la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7 DIR. PEN. CONT. 
93 (2018). 
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informed consent.108 However, both topics are strictly intertwined 
since the lack of adequate and complete information for the patient 
may give rise to a form of healthcare professional liability. 
This gap has been filled by a subsequent legal provision, Law 
219/2017. Its first article is indeed headed with “Informed Con-
sent.”109 This provision expresses the aim of the law, which is to 
recognize and protect fundamental rights—in compliance with both 
the Italian Constitution (in particular, arts. 2, 13, 32) and the Euro-
pean Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (arts. 1, 2, 3)—such as 
the right to life, health, dignity, and the right of self-determination, 
in particular mandating that no healthcare treatment should be car-
ried out without the free and informed consent of the involved per-
son. 
Before the enactment of this statutory recognition, the right to 
informed consent lacked a specific legal framework, but Italian 
judges used to ground it on the above-mentioned constitutional pro-
visions. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had highlighted the 
function of informed consent as a synthesis of both the right to self-
determination and the constitutional right to health, since both imply 
the right to complete and adequate information.110 
The task to outline the content and boundaries of this right has 
therefore been assigned to the Italian judges, who have developed a 
remarkable case law. Their role is still important since the recent law 
does not specifically address compensation of harm and does not 
clarify other related issues. A recent Italian Supreme Court ruling,111 
                                                                                                             
 108. A point of convergence between the 2017 Law and the topic of informed 
consent, has been identified in the duty of the physician, willing to adopt a differ-
ent approach to treat the patient than that recommended by the CPGs, to specifi-
cally reporting the reasons of her choice. Such decision, has been noted, shall be 
explained to (and agreed upon with) the patient, both in order for the consent of 
the latter being really effective and, at the same time, for ex ante, exculpatory 
purposes, having in mind the potential adverse effect of such decision in a judicial 
context. See Granelli, supra note 5, at nn. 54-56. 
 109. Legge Dec. 22, 2017, n. 219, in force since Jan. 31, 2018.  
 110. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 18, 2008, n. 438, available at https://perma 
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issued the day of publication of the Law 219/2017, is worth men-
tioning. The Court expressly adhered to the settled judicial orienta-
tion according to which the absence of the informed consent of the 
patient has autonomous dignity for purposes of damage-compensa-
tion. Consequently, the breach by the physician of the duty to secure 
the informed consent of the patient might cause different kinds of 
damage. Firstly, a damage to the patient’s health whenever she is 
able to demonstrate that had she been duly informed, she would have 
never undergone the surgery, thus avoiding its harmful conse-
quences. Secondly, damage for breach of the right to self-determi-
nation, which occurs when, due to the lack of information, the pa-
tient suffers a pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage (in this case pro-
vided that the harm is substantially serious112).  
Indeed, in the opinion of the Court, thanks to adequate and com-
plete information, the patient has: 
− the right to choose among different options of medical 
treatment; 
− the power to require further and different medical 
opinions; 
− the power to choose a different institution and/or spe-
cialist; 
− the right to refuse the surgery or the therapy and/or the 
right to consciously interrupt it; 
− the power to consciously prepare herself to the nega-
tive consequences of the surgeon wherever they result 
particularly burdensome and painful, even because 
completely unexpected for the patient due to the lack 
of relevant information.113 
The scenery of the harmful events is thus quite articulated. In 
particular, there might be: 
(1) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. § 3. Ex plurimis Cass., sez. III Civile, July 5, 2017, n. 16503; Cass., 
sez. III Civile, Oct. 13, 2017, n. 24074; Cass., sez. III Civile, Nov. 27, 2015, n. 
24220; and Cass., sez. III Civile, Feb. 13, 2015, n. 2854. 
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Dec. 4, 2018, n. 31234. 
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caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the 
physician in cases where the patient would have anyway undergone 
the surgery: in these circumstances, the compensation will cover 
only the damage to the health (pursuant to Supreme Court 
901/2018);  
(2) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has 
caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the 
physician in a situation where, if duly informed, the patient would 
have never undergone the surgery: in this case, the damage to be 
compensated will be the damage to the health of the patient as well 
as that due to the breach of the patient’s self-determination right;  
(3) lack of information about a surgery that has caused damage to 
the health of the patient not due to the fault of the physician, in cases 
where the patient would have anyway undergone the surgery: in this 
situation, the damage will cover the infringement to the patient’s 
right to self-determination, while the harm to the patient’s health 
shall be assessed on a case by case basis; and  
(4) lack of information about a surgery duly performed and not caus-
ing any damages to the patient’s health: in this scenario, the infringe-
ment of the patient’s right to self-determination shall be compen-
sated only if the patient has suffered the unexpected consequences 
resulting from the surgery without the necessary consciousness and 
being totally unprepared to them. 
For compensation of the damage to the right of self-determina-
tion, the damage should meet or exceed the legal threshold of seri-
ousness of the harm, as set forth by Supreme Court: Civil Joint Di-
vision no. 26972/2008 and 26975/2008.114 Again, the ongoing dia-
logue between the legislative, judicial, doctrinal formants has made 
it possible to ensure an appropriate legal framework to efficiently 
protect selected and deserving interest. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The topic of medical malpractice (rectius, healthcare liability) is 
very complex and interesting, and it is a field where the “law in ac-
tion” plays a fundamental role, even in light of the manifold, heter-
ogeneous, and sometimes conflicting interests of different stake-
holders. Within the Italian legal system, the relevant legal frame-
work has been developed thanks to a constant and articulated dia-
logue among different formants. In a first period, such dialogue oc-
curred in particular between the Italian Judges and the opinion of 
jurists. Recently, the statutory formant has also been directly and 
actively involved.  
The analysis of the last six years reveals that this phenomenon 
is still a work in progress that needs to be adjusted and better tailored 
to the field. However, due to the peculiarities of medicine and 
healthcare protection and their transnational nature, the dialogue 
should occur not only among formants of the same legal system, but 
also looking at the experiences of other legal systems, and applying 
a critical comparative approach. Referring to the U.S. scenario, it 
proves evident that many issues raised by the Italian legislative 
choices have been analyzed there and investigated for some time, 
both in their positive and negative aspects. In this regard, the para-
digmatic example can be found in the debate surrounding the role 
and the function of CPGs, which are the undeniable protagonists of 
the attempt to cope with the new concept of medicine that seeks 
more standardization and links to scientific evidence (although there 
is no unanimous consensus at all about medicine being a science). 
In addition, the U.S. debate has highlighted the need to cope with 
the necessity to decrease healthcare costs, to enhance patients bene-
fit, and with the struggle to find suitable legal rules. 
However, a peculiar feature of the Italian legal system within 
this area of law is that the judicial formant has constantly been very 
active in developing and settling the legal framework, and in paying 
specific attention to claim its autonomy in interpreting and applying 
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the relevant norms, even when not properly in compliance with (or 
clearly departing from) the legislative choices.  
With specific reference to the topic of CPGs, the occurrence of 
clear “solos” by the Italian judges in such musical score is undenia-
ble. On the opposite side of the great theoretical emphasis placed by 
the 2017 Law on the exculpatory role of CPGs, there is indeed the 
systematic and constant distinction affirmed by the Italian judges 
about the unsuitability of CPGs to act as a shield or as an automatic 
waiver of liability on behalf of healthcare providers.115 
More generally, while the measures introduced by the 2017 Law 
seem to have achieved positive results regarding civil litigation, the 
same cannot be said about criminal litigation. This might provoke 
adverse effects in light of the high level of uncertainty and unpre-
dictability of medical malpractice claims,116 thus discouraging the 
                                                                                                             
 115. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3: “guidelines are an abridgement of the 
scientific, technological and methodological achievements concerning the spe-
cific operative fields, qualified in such way after an accurate selection and instal-
lation of different contributions, without any presumption of immobilism and 
lacking any suitability to stand as binding rules.” About the role of CPGs, see also 
the ruling of the Cass., sez. III Civile, ordinanza Nov. 30, 2018, n. 30998, affirm-
ing the absence of liability of both the physicians and the hospital for having ad-
ministered to a patient with a hemorrhagic risk a lower dose (i.e., the half) of 
heparin than the recommended one, in order to balance such risk with that of ve-
nous thrombosis. The departure from the recommendations set by the relevant 
CPGs is justified, in the opinion of the Court, by the need to reach a compromise 
between the two concurring risks. With specific regard to CPGs the court holds: 
CPGs (i.e., the leges artis sufficiently shared at least by a distinguished 
part of the scientific community in a given time) are not an insurmount-
able Procrustes’ bed . . . . They are only a parameter to assess the physi-
cian’s behavior: generally, a behavior in compliance with the CPGs will 
be diligent, whilst a behavior not in compliance with the CPGs will be 
negligent or imprudent. However, this does not mean that a behavior not 
in compliance with the CPGs might not be deemed diligent if the specific 
circumstances of the case dictate not to abide by such CPGs ( for exam-
ple, when the CPGs require a particular medicine but the patient is aller-
gic and thus the physician does not prescribe it); for the same reason even 
a behavior in compliance with the CPGs might be deemed negligent on 
the basis of the circumstances of the case (for example, when the CPGs 
recommend a surgery and the physician abides by them although the pa-
tient’s previous conditions do not allow her to tolerate a total anesthesia). 
 116. See, e.g., D’Alessandro, supra note 50, at 277; Caputo, supra note 47, at 
295; Alessandro De Santis, La colpa medica alla luce della legge Gelli-Bianco, 
7-8 STUD. IUR. 790, 796-798 (2017); (all arguing about the risks of liability of the 
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healthcare providers and negatively affecting the patients’ benefit. 
This uncertainty is further enhanced by the judicial clash about the 
proper interpretation of the 2017 Law, which the intervention of the 
Criminal Joint Division of the Supreme Court did not unravel. In 
this scenario the doctrinal formant seems called to find a balance 
between the (sometimes problematic) text of the law and the judicial 
interpretation. The conversation has just begun. 
                                                                                                             
Italian State for breach of art. 7 of the ECHR due to a legislative framework not 
suitable to guarantee the certain and predictable outcome of criminal trials). 
